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THE "MINIMUM STANDARD" OF THE TREATMENT
OF ALIENS*

Edwin Borchardt

I

N its note of August 3, 1938, the Mexican Government, by its
Minister of Foreign Affairs, contested the right of the United
States to demand compensation for the agricultural lands of American
citizens expropriated by Mexico since l 92 7. It asserted that the countries of this continent have vigorously maintained
"the principle of equality between nationals and foreigners, considering that the foreigner who voluntarily moves to a country
... in search of a personal benefit, accepts in advance, together
with the advantages which he is going to enjoy, the risks to which
he may find himself exposed. It would be unjust that he should
aspire to a privileged position safe from any risk, but availing himself, on the other hand, of the effort of the nationals which must
be to the benefit of the collectivity." 1

The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs then invoked article 9 of
the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States signed at Montevideo, 1933, which provides for complete jurisdiction of states within
their p._ational territory over all inhabitants, to the effect that
"nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the
law and the national authorities, and foreigners may not claim
rights other than or more extensive than those of nationals." 2

*

Revision of an address made before the American Society of International Law,
reprinted in part by permission from the Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1939.-Ed.
t Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale University Law School; A.B., Ph.D., Columbia; LL.B., New York Law School; LL.D. (Hon.), Berlin University; author, "Declaratory Judgments" (1934), "Governmental Responsibility in Tort" (1928),
"Neutrality'' (1937), etc., and numerous articles in legal periodicals.-Ed.
1 The entire correspondence is printed in 32 AM. J. INT. L. SuPP. 181-207
(1938). The above quotation is at page 188.
2 U. S. DEPT. STATE, TREATY SER. No. 881 (1935).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 38

Secretary Hull in his reply of August 22nd paid tribute to the
doctrine of equality but contended that it "invariably referred to
equality in lawful rights of the person and to protection in exercising
such lawful rights." 8 He then expressed surprise at Mexico's announcement of the "astonishing theory" that this beneficent principle of
equality should be invoked not "to protect both human and property
rights" but to deprive and strip "individuals of their conceded rights."
He denied that this was permissible because Mexican nationals were
also despoiled. As to exposure to the same risks and the claim that
aliens enjoy a privileged position by seeking to escape confiscation,
Secretary Hull maintained that the Mexican doctrine of risk
"presupposes the maintenance of law and order consistent with
principles of international law; that is to say, when aliens are
admitted into a country the country is obligated to accord them
that degree of protection of life and property consistent with the
standards of justice recognized by the law of nations."' ·
He denied that this was a claim of special privilege in contravention of
the Montevideo treaty and maintained that confiscation could not be
excused by the "inapplicable doctrine of equality."
During the meeting of the Committee of Experts for the Codification of International Law at Lima, Mr. Cruchaga Ossa of Chile
contended that article 9 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States 15 made the equality of rights the maximum that
could be claimed by any alien. He denied the existence of any "minimum standard" for the treatment of aliens; but remarked that even if
there were one recognized in Europe the countries on this continent
had in the first, second, fifth and seventh Inter-American Conferences
committed themselves to the doctrine of absolute equality, which ~enceforth constituted the rule of law in the Americas. Although Chile had
·in 1930 conceded that a denial of justice gave a foreign government a
privilege of intervening diplomatically on behalf of its nationals, Mr.
Cruchaga in 1938 was driven by the logic of his own position to dispute
the possibility of invoking diplomatic protection against denials of
32 AM: J. lNT. L. SuPP. 198 (1938).
'Ibid.
15 The United States made a long reservation to this convention, reserving its
rights under international law. U. S. Dept. State, Treaty Ser. No. 881 (1935). The
reservation was not referred to by Mr. Hull in his reply of August 22, 1938. 32 AM.
J. INT. L. SUPP. 191 (1938).
8
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justice, because nationals could not enjoy it.6 On September 10, 1938,
President Cardenas of Mexico attacked the whole conception of diplomatic protection as an impairment of national sovereignty.
Source of the Rights of Aliens
These positions require us to re-examine the whole structure of
international law. If it is true that the doctrine of equality is the final
test of international responsibility, then the source of international
responsibility lies in municipal law. Only when a state denies equality,
may international responsibility be asserted. Although this would seem
to contradict the rule that a state's international obligations are determined by international law, anything in ·its municipal law to the contrary notwithstanding,7 the growing spirit of nationalism, which Latin
American countries have not escaped, and the memory of past impositions have persuaded some of their publicists and statesmen to advocate
the suppression of diplomatic protection by Calvo clauses, by an assumed automatic nationalization if not naturalization of the alien, by
restricted statutory or treaty definitions of the term denial of justice 8
and now finally by the contention that the doctrine of equality forecloses all diplomatic protection.
In its note of September 2, 1938, Mexico insisted that municipal
law, not international law, was the source of the rights of individuals,
including aliens, and cited Oppenheim in support. 9 It contended that
6 Borchard, "The 'Committee of Experts' at the Lima Conference," 33 AM.
INT. L. 269 at 276-278 (1939). See the argument for equality in YEPES, LE
PANAMERICANISME 121-127 (1936).
1 Cf. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 5th ed., by Lauterpacht, 28 3 ( I 93 7):
"It is a well-established principle that a State cannot invoke its municipal legislation as
a reason for_ avoiding its international obligations. For essentially the same reason a
State, when charged with a breach of its international obligations with regard to the
treatment of aliens, cannot validly plead that according to its Municipal Law and
practice the act complained of does not involve discrimination against aliens as compared with nationals. This applies in particular to the question of the treatment of the
persons of aliens. It has been repeatedly laid down that there exists in this matter
a minimum standard of civilization, and that a State which fails to measure up to that
standard incurs international liability."
8 See Guerrero, "Report of Subcommittee," Annex to Questionnaire No. 4, L. OF
N. 1927. V (C. 196.M.70), p. 100. The Report is discussed by Borchard, "Theoretical Aspects of the International Responsibility of States," I ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
AUSLANDISCHES 0FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VoLKERRECHT, pt. I, p. 223 at 228 et
seq. (1929).
11 32 AM. J. INT. L. SuPP. 204-205 (1938), citing I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 5th ed., by Lauterpacht 508-509 (1937). See also Monnot (U.S.) v.
Venezuela, February 17, 1903, RALSTON, VENEZUELAN ARl3ITRATIONS OF 1903, p.

J.
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expropriation without compensation was in line with the "standards of
international law in accordance with the evolution which the traditional concepts of that law have necessarily undergone." 10 Without
now entering upon the specific question whether international law
protects against uncompensated expropriation, it may be agreed that the
so-called "rights of man" 11 are not a product of international law and
that the primary source of the alien's rights is municipal law. But the
argument overlooks the fact that treaty and custom have in the course
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries placed limitations on the
arbitrary power of a state to deprive aliens of elementary rights, and
that international tribunals enforce these claims. This is a body of
law which can be disregarded by a state only at the peril of international
responsibility, and while fashioned empirically it operates as a check on
arbitrariness. Like the common law, it has grown interstitially from
case to case. Thus, while equality is the ultimate that the alien may
ask of municipal law, which is by no means bound to grant equality, the
body of international law developed by diplomatic practice and arbitral
decision, indefinite as it may be, represents the minimum which each
state must accord the alien whom it admits. Whether called the fundamental, natural, or inherent rights of humanity or of man or of the
alien, this minimum has acquired a permanent place in the protective
ambit of international forums.
Growth and Function of International Law
But international law has not only been woven from the approved
practice of states in their diplomatic intercourse and from the decisions
of arbitral tribunals. It is also composed of the uniform practices of the
civilized states of the western world who gave birth and nourishment
to international law. Long before article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice made the "general principles
171 (1904) [S. Doc. 316, 58th Cong., 2d sess. (1904)]; Smith (U. S.) v. Mexico,
April II, 1839, 4 MooiE, ARBITRATIONS 3374 {1898); Lewis (Gt. Brit.) v. United
States, May 8, 1871, 3 ibid., 3019; Only Son (U. S.) v. Great Britain, February 8,
1853, 4 ibid., 3404. See also STEINBACH, UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUM INTERNATIONALEN
FREMDENRECHT 90, note (1931).
10 32 AM, J. INT. L. SUPP. 202 (1938).
11 Cf. Declaration of the Rights of Man, adopted by the Institute of International
Law at its Briarcliff meeting, 1929, 24 AM. J. INT. L. 560 (1930); Kaufmann,
"Regles Generales du Droit de la Paix," 54 AcADF.MIE DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL,
REcUEIL DES CouRS 313 at 427 (1935), where they are called the fundamental
rights of aliens; bibliography in I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 5th ed., by
Lauterpacht, 510, note (1937).
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of law recognized by civilized states" a source of common international
law, foreign offices and arbitral tribunals had relied on such general
principles to work out a loose minimum which they applied constantly
in interstate practice. For example, the doctrine nulla poena sine lege
is accepted by common practice as a fundamental right of the alien, and
the professed revolutionary departure from this principle by certain
states would, if applied to aliens, meet with strong resistance. The
disability of the alien to claim political rights and his immunity from
military service and other political obligations have now a stronger
source than the statutes or treaties in which these disabilities and privileges were orginally recorded. They now rest on common law. In
most states, the elementary private rights of life, liberty and property,
within their well-recognized and increasing limitations, are not denied
to aliens any more than they are to nationals.
When, then, in particular cases they are withheld by administrative
action in spite of the constitution or law, the international claim would
rest on the state's violation of its own law and not on the minimum
standard. It is well known that aliens may· be denied numerous privileges, such as the ownership of real property and engagement in certain occupations, and may be restricted in other respects by municipal
law. Yet the alien must enjoy police and judicial protection for such
rights as the local law grants and its arbitrary refusal is a denial of
justice. Bad faith, fraud, outrage resulting in injury, cannot be defended on the ground that it is a custom of the country to which
nationals must also submit. The helpless position of the alien in the
Roman law and through the Middle Ages has undergone a change
with the growth of the national state and the migration of men. The
unlimited power of spoliation has been subjected to the control of
international law. Who can deny that this has been an advantage to
the world?
Indeed, the limitations on arbitrariness have exerted a useful influence on municipal law, and these in civilized states have operated to
the benefit of all men. Due process of law has been to some extent internationalized by the fact that international tribunals have drawn on the
mores of the average and not of the crudest municipal practice. While
at times diplomatic protection in the hands of dominant powers has
oppressed weak states, I ·venture to say that the shoe is now on the
other foot. Indeed, the effect of international adjudication, the growth
of nationalism, the movements for codification, the greater tolerance
of social experimentation have encouraged weak states to invoke their

450
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national sovereignty either to escape the restrictions of international
law, or to maintain that international law has changed content so as to
support what it once disapproved.1::
The Doctrine of Equality
The states of Latin America lay claim to a peculiar virtue in placing
the alien on a footing of civil equality with the national. This provision
was first introduced into modern civil codes by Andres Bello, the
famous Venezuelan who in I 85S drafted the Chilean Civil Code. In
granting such equality, they go beyond the requirements of international law. But in so doing they cannot, as some profess, escape the
obligations of international law. And the civil equality, even if it were
in practice granted as written, is a very limited one and hardly different from that accorded by most western states. Most impositions and
discriminations come from public law and administrative encroachments. If these could freely be perpetrated, and if the fact that nationals are also spoliated or prejudiced were an adequate defense, the
state would escape the control of international law, and that in effect
is the implied purpose of the argument. Mexico, in its note of September 2, 1938, frankly contended that the equality of treatment was not
established "to protect the rights of foreigners against the state," but,
on the contrary, to defend "weak states against the unjustified pretension of foreigners who, alleging supposed international laws, demanded a privileged position." ls But what of justified pretel}sions?
The doctrine of equality as the final test of international obligations
is thus in effect a repudiation of the many decisions of international
tribunals which establish· such obligations as a rule of international law.
And yet the campaign for equality as the :final test is unrelenting.
At the Hague Codification Conference, Dr. C. C. Wu of China made
12 If there were no. force in international law to insure respect for the rights of
aliens, and if it had no substantive content, the Permanent Court of International
Justice would have been wrong in asserting the existence of a common or generally
accepted international law respecting the treatment of aliens, applicable to them
despite municipal legislation. HAGUE, PERM. CT. INT. J., SER. A, No. 7, pp. 22,
23 (May 25, 1926). The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 provides that citizens of the
allied powers shall be treated in accordance with "modern" or "ordinary'' international
law. Art. 2, 18 AM. J. INT. L. SuPP. 68 (1924). The treaty between the United States
and Germany, 1923, provides that nationals of each country shall be treated by the other
with "that degree of protection that is required by international law." Art. 1, 20 AM. J.
INT. L. Supp. 5 (1926). See FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
STATES FOR DENIAL OF JusTICE 502 et seq. (1938), an excellent summary of the
evidence on the minimum standard.
13 32 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP. 205 (1938).
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the plausible argument that when a foreigner comes to a country he
must be prepared for all the local conditions, political and physical,
as he is prepared for the weather. He must take what he finds and
cannot complain of a defective or corrupt administration any more than
nationals can. Seventeen countries, mainly the lesser states, supported
this argument, although it was restricted to the remedies available to
injured aliens. Twenty-one countries, including all the great powers
represented, opposed it as contrary to international law, and on that
issue the projected draft of a convention fell to pieces. As in other cases,
those who are opposed to prevailing rules of international law avail
themselves of a codification conference to endeavor to break down
rules of law that conflict with their interests. Sovereignty is more emotionally invoked by the less mature than by older states. These weaker
countries often disregard the rule, axiomatic in fact, that a state claiming
the privileges of international law must comply with its duties, or deny
that there is any duty to establish any degree or standard of organization or perform any normal obligations with respect to aliens. All
such requirements are deemed to impose upon them some external
standard as a condition of statehood and this they resent. They thus
claim that the test of their responsibility for injuries is purely domestic
and that if nationals are despoiled aliens will also have to submit.
Otherwise they maintain the alien would be to them a source of danger.
They wish to be the exclusive judges of their conduct toward all
inhabitants, including aliens.
Up to a certain point, we might agree. For nearly all purposes,
equality of treatment with nationals would satisfy international law
requirements. Most states comply with that vague minimum which has
been posited as indispensable to an admissible state. Equality then
grants more than the alien or his government can ordinarily ask, for
in the absence of treaty there is no rule prohibiting certain discriminations against aliens. But in spite of and beyond equality, there is a
margin of fundamental privileges and immunities which cannot be
transgressed _without responsibility under international law. While it is
inaccurate to assume that this collection of "fundamental" rights is
claimable by all individuals against any state, they are claimable on the
alien's behalf by his own state, as yet the only authorized vindicator
of local rights improperly denied; for their observance a state is responsible even if nationals have no redress.

452
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Reasons Why Equality is Insufficient
The doctrine of equality has therefore little or no relation to the
minimum which practice has established. If it delimited the international minimum, as it does the local maximum, municipal law would
replace international law. as the test of international responsibility.
International tribunals seek their criteria of responsibility not merely
in municipal law but in common experience rooted in the mores of the
time. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries these were found
in constitutions which placed the individual on a high plane of protection in his relations with the state. It is possible that the retrogressions
of the twentieth century will create new mores which will disregard
the rights of the individual, deny him all protection against the group
and possibly even subordinate international law to the sovereign state.
That will require something of a revolution in thought and law. But
only then will we have reached the stage where the doctrine of equality wi11 have become the final test of state responsibility. Until that
time, we are warranted in assuming that the common practice of western
civilization still respects the elementary rights which we have come
to associate with the modern world and enlightened civilization and that
the decisions of international tribunals which reflect these mores are to
be deemed law. No single state or even group of states can resign from
that law.
The doctrine of absolute equality-more theoretical than actualis therefore incompatible with the supremacy of international law.
The fact is that no state grants absolute equality or is bound to grant
it. It may even discriminate between aliens, nationals of different states,
e.g., as the United States does through treaty in the matter of the
ownership of real property in this country. While states naturally desire
a free.hand in dealing with all their inhabitants and while it is probably
embarrassing to be restrained by treaty or international law in perpetrating excesses, this is one of the conditions of international intercourse.
Contrary to the common view, the United States and other strong states
probably pay more in damages for breach of international duty than
do the smaller states, which are disposed to invoke their abstract sovereignty to escape international responsibility. For example, United
States mob violence cases are unfortunately a frequent source of responsibility, and it would seem strange to an American to contend that
aliens like nationals must suffer such excesses without redress. When
the argument for equality is associated with a refusal to accept the
requirement of some normal degree of state organization, it is apparent
that it is a demand for escape from international obligations. Even an
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admission that treaties have placed some limitations upon this freedom
of action would not concede that general international law has any say
in the matter.
As a further explanation of why the alien is not bound to submit
to exceptional excesses, even if nationals cannot escape, John Bassett
- ·Moore in his brief in the Constancia Sugar case before the Spanish
Treaty Claims Commission remarked that nationals are presumed to
4ave a political remedy, whereas the alien's inability to exercise political
rights deprives him of one of the principal safeguards against oppression.1'
Yet another powerful reason is the fact that diplomacy, international practice and arbitral decision have established the rule that
equality of treatment, while prima facie a fair defense, is not conclusive
of international duty and responsibility. Acting Secretary Polk in I 9 I 8
was not the first to point this out.u In the Hopkins case before the
United States-Mexico General Claims Commission of 1923 the
tribunal concluded that by virtue of their diplomatic and arbitral appeal
aliens may on occasion receive ''broader and more liberal treatment"
than nationals under municipal law.15 But the court denied that this
1' In Library of Congress, Briefs and Records, Spanish Treaty Claims Commission,
JX238.

.
"The Government of the United States is firmly of the opinion that the great
weight of international law and practice supports the view that every nation has certain
minimum duties to perform with regard to the treatment of foreigners, irrespective of
its duties to its own citizens, and that in default of such performance, it is the right
of the foreign government concerned to enter protest. • • • While the Mexican Government may see fit to confiscate vested property rights of its own citizens, such action
is in equity no justification for the confiscation of such rights of American citizens and
does not estop the Government of the United States from protesting on behalf of its
citizens against confiscation of their property." Mr. Polle, Acting Secretary of State to
Ambassador Henry P. Fletcher, December 13, 1918, FoREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES 786-787 (1918) (U. S. Dept. State). See also address by Mr. Root,
"The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad," 4 PRoc. Soc. INT. L. 16 at
21 (1910); also I HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 466 (1922); Note of Secretary Hull to
Mexico, August 22, 1938, 32 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP. 191 (1938).
16 "If it be urged that under the provisions of the Treaty of 1923 as construed
by this Commission the claimant Hopkins enjoys both rights and remedies against
Mexico which it withholds from its own citizens under its municipal laws, the answer
is that it not infrequently happens that under the rules of international law applied to
controversies of an international aspect a nation is required to accord to aliens broader
and more liberal treatment than it accords to its own citizens under its municipal laws.
The reports of decisions made by arbitral tribunals long prior to the Treaty of 19i3
contain many such instances. There is no ground to object that this amounts to a
discrimination by a nation against its own citizens in favor of aliens. It is not a question
of discrimination, but a question of difference in their respective rights and remedies.
The citizens of a nation may enjoy many rights which are withheld from aliens, and,
111
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amounted to a discrimination against a state's own citizens and in favor
of aliens. In the Roberts case the tribunal remarked:
"Roberts was accorded the same treatment as that given to all
other persons. . . . Facts with respect to equality of treatment of
aliens and nationals may be important in determining the merits
of a complaint of mistreatment of an alien. But such equality is
not the ultimate test of the propriety of the acts of authorities in
the light of international law. That test is, broadly speaking,
whether aliens are treated in accordance with ordinary standards
of civilization." 11
DisregMd of the ·Doctrine of Equality in Most Cases
of Denial of Justice
It is only in the matter of substantive law, when the claim is advanced that particular rights, such as the right of property, may not
be withdrawn from aliens, that the issue of equality seriously arises to
challenge the claim that the international standard has been violated.
Mexico in its notes of I938 referred to its agricultural expropriations
as "general and impersonal" in character, affecting "equally all the
inhabitants of the country." There were various considerations, historical, legal, and conventional, which militated against the un,compensated expropriation of American-owned agricultural. lands, but in
principle it is always difficult, though not impossible, to contend that a
change in substantive national policy violates common international
law. Such questions cannot be answered in the abstract. Few countries
would concede that their substantive law or administration falls below
a civilized standard.
The bulk of the cases arise out of a denial of justice in the matter
of procedure, some gross deficiency in the vindication and enforcement
conversely, under international law aliens may enjoy rights and remedies which the
nation does not accord to its own citizens." Hopkins (U. S.) v. Mexico, Mar. ZI,
1926, 1 OPINIONS OF CoMMISSIONERs, GENERAL CLAIMS CoMMISSION (U. S. and Mexico, 1923), 42 at 50-51 (1927) [hereinafter cited Op. Comm.]. See also Neer
(U.S.) v. Mexico, 1 OP. Co!',,IM. 71 (Oct. 15, 1926); Faulkner (U.S.) v. Mexico,
ibid., 86 (Nov. 2, 1926).
11
Roberts (U. S.) v. Mexico, 1 OP. CoMM. 100 at 105 (Nov. 2, 1926). In its
case against Belgium before the Permanent Court of International Justice, known as
the Oscar Chinn case,-HAGUE, PERM. CT. INT. J., SER. C, No. 75, p. 41 et seq.
(Dec. 12, 1934)-the British Government adduced the Sicilian sulphur monopoly
case, the Uruguayan and Italian insurance monopolies of 1911, and the. well-known
collection of opinions solicited by 'Edouard Clunet on the propriety of the Italian
monopoly, practically all of which support the principle that the mere equality of
treatment of national and alien will not be sufficient to satisfy the international standard.
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of alien rights. A corrupt administration of justice, judicial or administrative, which is now more common than in the nineteenth century,
gives rise to responsibility, regardless of the question whether nationals
must submit to the same corruption. A perversion of justice by judges
carrying out a national policy and not applying impartially the rules of
law, is especially reprehensible and excuses the resort to or exhaustion
of local remedies. Bad faith cannot be tested by national standards; it
invites a more general criterion which international tribunals have not
hesitated to invoke.18 The more extreme denials of justice will be
judged international delinquencies without reference to the question
of equality.1'
In order to limit the international responsibility of the state, several
attempts have been made by Latin American countries to confine the
term denial of justice by legislative definition to such matters as the
18 See address by Root, ''The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad,"
4 PRoc. AM. Soc. INT. L. 16 at 25 (1910): "in many countries the courts are not
independent; the judges are removable at will; they are not superior, as they ought
to be, to local prejudices and passions, and their organization does' not afford to the
foreigner the same degree of impartiality which is accorded to citizens of the country,
or which is required by the common standard of justice obtaining throughout the
civilized world." Accord: DuNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS l 19 (1932); Kuhn,
"Protection of Nationals Charged with Crime Abroad," 3 l AM. J. INT. L. 94 at 96
(1937); BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS, 2d ed., 173 (1936). See also Chattin
(U. S.) v. Mexico, l OP. CoMM. 422 at 441 (July 23, 1927) (Nielsen's opinion);
Roberts (U.S.) v. Mexico, ibid., 100 at 105 (Nov. 2, 1926).
19 Neer (U. S.) v. Mexico, l OP. CoMM. 71 at 73 (Oct. l 5, 1926): "the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of international standards." The
tribunal added: "the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international
delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to
an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency." See also Garcia
(Mexico)
United States, ibid., 163 at 169 (Dec. 3, 1926); Roberts (U. S.) v.
Mexico, ibid., 100 at 105 (Nov. 12, 1926); Fabiani (France) v. Venezuela, Dec.
30, 1896, 5 MooRE, ARBITRATIONS 4878 at 4893 (1898). See also cases discussed in
FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE
543 et seq. (1938).
HUBER, -RECLAMATIONS BRITANNIQUES DANS LA ZoNE EsPAGNOLE DU MoRoc
54 ( l 92 5), after denying liability for the acts of individuals, added that "restriction
thus attached to the right of States to intervene for the protection of their citizens
assumes that the general security in the country of residence does not fall below a certain
level and that at least their protection by the courts does not become purely illusory."
In several cases before the General Claims Commission, United States and
Mexico, the facts disclosed a maladministration of justice "below the standard prescribed
by international law." Galvan (Mexico) v. United States, l OP. CoMM. 408 at 410
(July 21, 1927); Swinney (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid., 131 (Nov. 16, 1926). See
numerous quotations in FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES
FOR DENIAL OF JusncE 560-562 (1938), from the decisions of other tribunals.
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refusal of access to the courts and the discriminatory refusal to exercise
jurisdiction such as nationals enjoy, and to overlook as immaterial
local bias the nature and integrity of the judicial machinery and its
conformity with elementary principles of justice. This was the substance of the Guerrero Report to the Codification Conference of 1930.20
International tribunals and Foreign Offices have not consented to such
limitations of international responsibility.
The Standard of Civilized Justice
It is thus apparent21 that both in its substantive and procedural aspects international law, as evidenced by diplomatic practice and arbitral
decision, has established the existence of an international minimum stand20 Borchard, "The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners," 23 AM. J. INT. L. SPECIAL SUPP.
{Part II) 175, 219 (1929); Guerrero, "Report of Subcommittee," Annex to Questionnaire No. 4, L. OF N. 1927. V (C. 196.M.70), p. 92 at 100; Borchard, "Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territories to the Person or Property
of Foreigners," 20 AM. J. INT. L. 738 (1926).
21 Beside the cases referred to, see the report of the international conference at
Paris on the treatment of aliens, 25 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 218
( 1930): ''Without doubt it is recognized today in all civilized states that the treatment
of aliens is subject to a certain standard of international law whose violation may give
rise to diplomatic action of governments." Also the following publicists: Scelle, in 1
REVUE DE DR01T INTERNATIONAL (Lapradelle) 1n6 (1927): "The Permanent
Court of International Justice has held that aliens have the right to a treatment better
than nationals whenever nationals are treated contrary to [international] common
law." Kaufmann, "Der ungarisch-rumanische Streit iiber die rumanische Agrarreform vor
dem Volkerbundsrate," [1927] ZEITSCHRIFI' FUR 0STRECHT 1243 at 1260, and in
his brief before the Permanent Court, HAGUE, PERM. CT. INT. J., SER, C., No. 11,
343 at 412 (1926): ''Whenever internal law with respect to aliens is found below the
requirements of the international standard, notably if there is a denial of justice, the
alien has even a right to treatment superior to that which internal law accords nationals,"
As put by STEINBACH, UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUM INTERNATIONALEN FREMDENRECHT
80 (1931), the state only then meets the requirements of international law in granting
equality to nationals and aliens when the treatment of nationals corresponds to the
measures which international law requires. In support of this view, he cites an article by
Barthelemy, z CAUSES CELEBRES 314 (1929); aL"<> Anzilotti, Richter and Schmid.
Other authors who sustain these views are: 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw,
§§ 266-267 (i922); Dunn, "International Law and Private Property Rights," 28
CoL. L. REV•.166 at 175 (1928); 1 AccIOLY, TRATADo DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL
PUl3L1CO 335-336 (1933); 8 LAPRADELLE, REPERTOIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,
''Etranger," (Basdevant),
7-19, 303 et seq.' (1930); l MOLLER, INTERNATIONAL
LAw IN PEACE AND WAR, translated from Danish by H. M. Pratt, 133, 148 (1931);
Witenberg, ''La protection de la propriete immobiliere des etrangers," 55 J. DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL {Clunet) 566 (1928); HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 8th ed., by
Higgins, 59-60 (1924); Leibholz, "Das Verbot der Willkiir und des Ermessensmissbrauches in Volkerrechtlichten Verkehr der Statten," I ZEITSCHRIFI' FUR AUSLiiNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VoLKERRECHT, pt. 1, p. 77 at 97-99 (1929);
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ard to which all civilized states are required to conform under penalty
of- responsibility. Even Latin American authors sustain this view. 22
But the existence of the standard and its service as a criterion of
international responsibility in specific instances by no means gives us
a definition of its content. Frequent reference to it may easily give rise
see also Ill HATSCHEK UND STRUPP, WoRTERBUCH DES VoLKERRECHTS UND DER
D1PLOMATIE 821 (1924); STRUPP, DAs VoLKERRECHTLICHE DEL1KT 118 (1920)
(3 HANDBUCH DES VoLKERRECHTS, pt. 3); TRIEPEL, VoLKERRECHT UND LANDESRECHT 330 (ICJ07). CAVAGLIERI, CoRSO DI DIRITTO INTERNATIONALE, 3d ed., 334
( 1934); 1 FAUCHILLE, TRAiri DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PuBLic, part I, 928
(1922); DECENCIERE-FERRAND!ERE, LA RESPONSABILITE INTERNATIONALE DES ETATS
57 (1925); BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, 2d ed., 172 (1936).
22 ALVAREZ, EsPOSE I>E MOTIFS ET DECLARATION DES GRANDS PRINCIPES DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL MODERNE 52, 54-55 (1936): "In no case, may aliens claim more rights
than nationals, unless the country in which they reside does not assure to its inhabitants,
in permanent fashion, the minimum of rights to which Article 25(b) and Articles 28
and 29 refer" (Article 30). Article 25(b) provides that states must maintain a political
and legal organization which permits all persons residing on their territory to exercise
their rights and enjoy advantages which the sentiment of international justice to-day
imposes on all civilized people. Article 28 provides that every state must assure to every
individual on its territory the full and entire protection of the right to life, liberty, and
property without distinction of nationality, race, language, or religion. Article 29
provides for the free exercise of all faiths, etc.
While these provisions may to some extent be deemed aspirations, they indicate
that the author approves the minimum standard. See also the AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, CoDIFICATION OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LAw, Projects
I 5 and I 6 ( I 92 5), which establish that each Government is obliged to maintain
"internal order and governmental stability indispensable to compliance with its international obligations," probably an excessive requirement, and that they only are
responsible when they have not "maintained order in the interior" or have been
"negligent in the suppression of acts which disturb that order," or have omitted to
take "reasonable precautions to avoid" injuries to aliens. In "Diplomatic Protection"
(project no. 16, ibid.), the American Institute established that aliens cannot claim
more "obligations and responsibility" than are conceded to nationals in "the constitution, laws and treaties in force." But diplomatic protection is permitted when
there has been a "denial of justice by those authorities, undue delay or violation of
the principles of international law."
In 1933, the American Institute submitted to the Montevideo Conference the
following article: "The jurisdiction of States, within limits of the national territory,
extends to all tlie inhabitants. The inhabitants, nationals and aliens, enjoy a single protection as the national laws and authorities pro,•ide. Aliens cannot demand rights different or more extended than the rights of nationals. [This] equal protection must
assure nationals and aliens the minimum [ of rights] exacted by international law." See
also I Ruiz MoRENo, LEcc10NES DE DERECHO INTERNATIONAL PuBLICo 238, 260
(1934); I AccIOLY, TRATAI>O DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 268 (1933).
MAURTUA and ScoTT, RESPONSIBILITY oF STATES, 4 5 ( 1930) : "There is a
minimum juridical standard imposed by human civilization, without which neither the
existence of the State as a sovereign entity nor th~t of the international community
could be conceived." 1 ULLOA, DERECHO INTERNATIONAL PuBLico, 2d ed., 224, 243
( 1938).
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to the erroneous inference that it is definite and definable,23 whereas
the variability of time, place and circumstance make it even less precise
than the term "due process of law," which has also with the passage of
time added substantive content to its procedural controls. The international standard is compounded of general principles recognized by
the domestic law of practically every civilized country, and it is not
to be supposed that any normal state would repudiate it or, if able, fail
to observe it. Referring to .its procedural aspects, Mr. Root in I 9 IO
characterized it as "a standard of justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of such general acceptance by all civilized countries as to
form a part of the international law of the world." 24
While the standard is mild, :flexible and variable according to circumstances, some attempt has been made to collate out of experience a
number of minimum rights which all states claiming membership in
the family of nations may be required to accord. While not identical
with the unofficial "rights of man" which the Institute of International
Law hoped to exact from each state, the substantive content of the
standard nevertheless is associated with certain elementary privileges of
human existence which every state admitting aliens may be deemed
to extend-mainly rights to life and the elementary liberties connected with the earning of a living. How far these privileges may be
impaired or curtailed in the public interest must be determined from
case to case, and equality of sacrifice with nationals is naturally an important test. As a rule, unjustified discrimination will be found an ingredient in sustainable claims.211
In recent years the question whether the protection of private property against confiscation is included within the minimum standard has
Cf. BATY, THE CANoNs OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 133 (1930).
Root, "The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad," 4 PRoc. AM.
Soc. INT. L. 16 at 21 (1910), quoted in' 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 466, note
2 (1922).
211 In 1929 a conference was held in Paris under the auspices of the League of
Nations to endeavor to work out a convention on the treatment of foreigners. Preparatory Documents, L. of N. 1929. II (C. I. T. E. I. C. 36.M.21); Draft Convention
on the Treatment of Foreigners, L. OF N. 1928. II (C. 174.M.53). The Convention
broke down largely becaus,c; . many states declined· to commit themselves to concede
equality to foreigners. Cutler, "The Treatment of Foreigners," 27 AM. J. INT. L.
225 (1933); Kuhn, "The International Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners,"
24 AM. J. INT. L. 570 (1930). Interestingly, the Hague Codification Conference of
1930 on responsibility of states broke down largely because the majority of states
refused to admit that equality of treatment satisfied in all cases the international
standard.
28
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given rise to much debate.25 Mexico openly asserted in its notes to the
United States of August 3 and September 3, 1938, that there is no
international obligation to make compensation for the expropriation of
property, "general and impersonal" in character, provided a social
purpose is served, and that its only duty in the premises arose under
Mexican law. In the light of the recent invasions of the institution of
private property, in Russia, in the agrarian reforms of eastern European countries, in article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles, and in the
many extensions of the police power, a few publicists, notably Sir John
Fischer Williams, seem to support the Mexican view. 27 The great
majority, however, rely on modern constitutions and treaties which still
respect private property, permitting direct expropriation only against
compensation, and regard the instances cited as aberrations not impairing the general principle.28 Perhaps it is dangerous to rely on any
general principle for decision of a concrete case, but it can hardly be
maintained that private property has lost all legal protection and that
the state can confiscate at its pleasure. But how far it may go will have
26 See THE MEXICAN EXPROPRIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, memorandum
filed in Department of State, October II, 1938, pp. 103-130.
27 Williams, "International Law and the Property of Aliens," 9 BRITISH YEAR
BooK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (1928}; MARBURG, DER RUMANISCH-UNGARISCHE
OPTANTENSTREIT VOR DEM GEMISCHTEN ScHIEDSGERICHT UND DEM V0LKERBUND
(1928} j also in 3 HATSCHEK UND STRUPP, WoRTERBUCH DES VoLKERRECHTS UND
DER D1PLOMATIE 820 (1929). Cf. I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 5th ed., by
Lauterpacht, 283-285 (1937) (partial compensation necessary).
28 Chorz6w case, HAGUE PERM. CT. INT. J. SER. A, No. 7, pp. 21-22 (May
25, 1926), immunity from confiscation deemed a part of the "accepted principles of
international law." Peter Pazmany University (Hungary) v. Czechoslovakia, HAGUE
PERM. CT. INT.]., SER, A/B, No. 61 (Dec. 15, 1933). Judge Robert Fazy (Switzerland) in the·case between Germany and Romania, September 27, 1928, held that the
"respect of private property and vested rights of aliens is uncontestably a part of the
general principles admitted by the law of nations." 3 REVUE DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL
(Lapradelle) 558 (1929). See British Observations in Portuguese expropriations of
religious properties, quoted in Fachiri, "Expropriation and International Law," 6
BRITISH YEAR BooK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 159 at 168 (1925). Also Fachiri,
"International Law and the Property of Aliens," IO BRITISH YEAR BooK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 32 at 38 (1929); Shufeldt (U.S.) v. Guatemala, 1931, U.S. DEPT,
STATE, ARBITRATION SER. No. 3 (1932); STEINBACH, UNTERSUCHUNGEN zuM INTERNATIONALEN FREMDENRECHT 90, note (1931); 34 REP. INT. L. AssN. 248 (1926);
Verdross, "Regles Generales du Droit International de la Paix," 30 AcADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES CouRs 271 at 442 (1929); Verdross, "Les
Regles lnternationales Concernant le Traitement des Etrangers," 37 ibid. 327 at 330,
3 59 ( l 93 I) ; Kaeckenbeeck, "The Protection of Vested Rights in International Law,"
17 BRITISH YEAR BooK oF INTERNATIONAL LAw 16 (1936). ·
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to be determined from case to case. The doctrine of vested rights de,
pends on so many variables that prediction is hazardous. 29
On the procedural side, we are perhaps in less doubt of the content
of the standard, although we must still be satisfied with general principles. Fair courts, readily open to aliens, administering justice honestly,
impartially, without bias or political control, seem essentials of international due process. While the details of procedure necessarily vary
considerably from country to country, certain essential elements of a
fair trial and objective justice are required of all systems. It is probably
less difficult to apply than to define these principles, and we have in
their application the aid of innumerable precedents from international
practice. In spite of the legislative effort strictly to narrow the conception of denial of justice and the privilege of diplomatic interposition,
few foreign countries have been willing to abandon their nationals to
the arbitrariness of corrupt courts or administrative bodies.
Policy

It is well that this is so. Notwithstanding the determined effort of
several countries to make equality the final test of international responsibility, it is doubtful whether even the Montevideo Convention will
be given such an interpretation. For some Latin American countries
this endeavor is part of the general campaign to get rid· of diplomatic
protection. It might be called an exemplification of the Calvo Clause;
a Mexican author has recently baptized it as the Cardenas Doctrine.30
What it means is a repudiation of international law, a claim for the
supremacy of local law over international law, a denial that local law
and arbitrariness may be limited by international requirements. Its
assertion does not raise the prestige of the countries who advance it, but
on the contrary creates suspicion. As already observed, few if any
countries are now the victims of unjustified diplomatic interposition
on behalf of foreign claimants; indeed, much is now tolerated which
even ten years ago would have elicited forceful action. Countries that
seek to escape international responsibility by maintaining that they
have no ol' few obligations with respect to aliens neither win respect
for their sovereignty nor awaken that confidence which is reflected in
29 Cf. the excellent article of Dunn, "International Law and Private Property
Rights," 28 CoL. L. REv. 166 (1928).
ao MENDOZA, LA DocTRINA CARDENAS 78 (1939). It is partly expressed as follows:
The national who migrates abroad [ the alien] permanently or temporarily must
accept the local law as if he were a national and must abanqon any rights attached to
alienage, including diplomatic protection.
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foreign investment. Strong powers, able to make demands for unlimited sovereignty, refrain from so doing and submit frequently to
arbitration and the test of international law. With the current general
disapproval of the use of force in the collection of claims, there is no
reason why weaker states cannot entrust! their complaints and defenses
to the test of law. The international standard restricts their freedom
but very slightly. A voluntary conformity to the standard and to the
rules of international law and practice which it embodies would be
more profitable in the long run than the ill-will and lack of confidence
aroused by unsuccessful revolt against the standard and by a professed
freedom from t,he restraints on arbitrariness hitherto associated with
international law.

